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KAYSER-ROTH, JOSLYN, AND THE PROBLEM
OF PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA
by
JAMES A. KING"
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the liability, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)', of parent corporations
for response costs caused by their subsidiaries. Although the principle of limited
shareholder liability has historically protected parent corporations from third-party
claims against their subsidiaries, 2 with increasing frequency parents are finding
themselves personally liable for cleanup costs resulting from contamination their
subsidiaries have caused. The courts have abrogated the rule of limited liability
by holding parent, and even affiliated, corporations liable directly under the terms
of CERCLA itself,4 and indirectly through "piercing the corporate veil" pursuant
to federal common law.5
In abrogating the doctrine of limited shareholder liability in the parent
corporation context, the courts have created a powerful instrument for recovering
the substantial costs associated with the cleanup of sites contaminated with
hazardous substances.6 Yet there are a number of inherent problems with the
courts' rejection of this rule. For instance, limited liability of shareholders is
traditionally governed by state law. And the states by and large have been quite
reluctant to "pierce the veils" of corporations to reach shareholders. Nonetheless,
the majority of federal courts addressing whether parent corporations may be
* Assistant to the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Army, The Penta-
gon, Washington, D.C. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Ohio State University. I thank Roy Gardner
and especially Earl Stockdale for reading and commenting on various drafts. Errors, or course, remain
mine. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those
of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2 For a discussion of the principle, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 6-10 (1986).
See Aronovsky & Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under
CERCLA, U.S.F.L. REV. 421 (1990); Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil Under CERCLA: To Control
or Not to Control - Which is the Answer?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 975 (1991).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 64-151.
SId.
6 See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 423-25.
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liable under CERCLA have held that the statute authorizes shareholder liability,
despite the fact that this type of claim, under the facts and circumstances with
which these courts have been presented, could not be sustained under state law.
Moreover, it is unclear what the imposition of derivative responsibility upon
parent corporations may portend for the future of corporate activity. The statute's
authorization of retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability has sent
shockwaves throughout several markets in the United States, 7 most noticeably in
the banking8 and in the insurance markets.9 Further judicial restrictions on the
protection parent corporations enjoy under the rule of limited liability may force
similar shockwaves to ripple throughout various corporate structures and
transactions, thereby curtailing a considerable amount of beneficial commercial
activity.
This article examines these issues by focusing on the responsibility of
parent corporations as "owners" and as "operators" under section 107 of
CERCLA.10 The scope of the analysis is limited to corporations that participate
in the management of other corporations. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity,
the reach of the analysis is limited to the situation in which a corporation owns
one hundred percent of the stock of the subsidiary.
Part I provides a general overview of the principle of limited shareholder
liability as it applies to parent corporations and of its economic underpinnings.
Part II reviews judicial applications of CERCLA to parent corporations. My
discussion focuses on two recent decisions - United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp." and Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co. 2 - which represent the polar
judicial views on shareholder liability and contain probably the best discussions
in the case law thus far on this important issue. The district and appellate courts
in Kayser-Roth found a parent corporation liable directly and indirectly under
CERCLA. The courts in Joslyn, however, took the opposite position and declined
to hold that CERCLA imposes direct liability on shareholders. Instead, they
concluded that liability can only be imputed indirectly through piercing the
corporate veil, and then only if the shareholder used the corporate form to avoid
CERCLA liability.
See id. at 430, 450-51.
8 See Goldberg, How Well Could Your Bank Bounce Back from a Crisis?, AMERICAN BANKER, Dec. 3,
1990, at 4; Clark, How to Survive in the Environmental Jungle, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1990, at
89.
9 See Abraham, Environmental Liability and The Limits of Insurance, 88 COL L. REv. 942 (1988); see
also Abraham, Making Sense of the Insurance Liability Crisis, 48 OHIO ST.L.J. 399, 407-08 (1987).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
" United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989). affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 957 (1991).
12 Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D.La. 1988), aff d, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991).
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Finally, Part III criticizes the Kayser-Roth decision, as well as other
decisions finding parent corporations directly liable under CERCLA, on both
legal and policy levels. I conclude that parent corporation liability cannot be
sustained under CERCLA unless the parent has exploited the corporate form to
such an extent that piercing the corporate veil is warranted.
CERCLA AND LIMITED LIABILITY
A Brief Overview of CERCLA
Public anxiety over the dangers of hazardous waste disposal sites reached
a fever pitch in the late 1970s.' 3 Images of the "Love Canal" and other contami-
nated sites prompted a call for federal action to attack the problem. In 1980,
during the final days of Jimmy Carter's presidency, Congress responded by
enacting CERCLA,' 4 a statute designed to enable both federal and state
environmental agencies to begin immediately cleaning up contaminated sites. In
1986, Congress amended CERCLA, in part by passing the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).15
Together CERCLA and SARA (hereinafter collectively referred to as
CERCLA) provide a comprehensive statutory mechanism for countering the
problems associated with hazardous substances. 6 The Act has retroactive effect
and applies to the cleanup of all hazardous substances disposal sites, regardless
of the date of their origin.17 Under the statute, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) may either respond directly and clean up the site,18 or
order the parties responsible for the contamination to clean it up.' 9 If the EPA
chooses the former course, it uses the so-called "Superfund"20 to finance the
action.2' Section 107 of CERCLA allows the EPA, state agencies, and private
parties, to recover the costs of responding to a release or a threatened release of
hazardous substances, so long as those costs are consistent with the National
13 See F. ANDERSON. D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 602-03 (2d ed. 1990).
14 Id.
See generally Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod, & Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 E.L.R. 10362 (1987).
" For a general overview of the statute, see F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, supra note
13, at 614-19.
"7 See McSlarrow, Jones, & Murdock, A Decade of Superfund Litigation, 21 E.L.R. 10367, 10368 (July
1991).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); see also McSlarrow, Jones, & Murdock, supra note 17, at 10379-82.
'9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988); see also McSlarrow, Jones, & Murdock, supra note 17, at 10382-84.
20 Use of the fund is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
21 Id. at § 9611 (a)(1)
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Contingency Plan, by imposing strict, joint and several liability upon potentially
responsible parties (PRPs).22 PRPs include current owners and operators of the
disposal site, past owners and operators, waste generators, and transporters of the
waste.23
Although CERCLA's critics have argued that the statute has been, in large
part, ineffectual in promoting the clean up of this country's many hazardous waste
disposal sites, 24 CERCLA's draconian liability provisions have affected the way
businesses that handle hazardous substances conduct their affairs.25 But firms
that handle these wastes are not the only ones affected by the specter of CERCLA
liability. Individual and corporate shareholders of these firms have also been
affected by getting caught in the vast liability web Congress and the courts have
woven with CERCLA.26
The Principle of Limited Shareholder Liability
and Its Economic Foundations
Generally, stockholders are not personally liable for debts of corporations
in which they hold an equity interest. The axiom has its origins in the English
common law and has been carried over to the United States as part of state
corporation law. 27 Limited shareholder liability arose as a means to encourage
private investment by individuals in capitalist ventures, and to facilitate the
private exchange of those investments.28  To illustrate, if an individual share-
22 Id. at § 9607.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Weisskopf, Administrative Costs Drain Superfund, Wash. Post, June 19, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
The bulk of the criticism is found in commentaries written before the enactment of SARA. See, e.g.,
Developments In The Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L REV. 1458, 1484, 1484-1504 (1986);
Note, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 875 (1986).
2 See Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its Impact
on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. 101 (1985); Tunderman, Business Planning for Hazardous
Waste Management Requirements, Risks, and Strategies, 1983 B.Y.U.L. REV. 679; Comment, Corporate
Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What are the Consequences?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 677
(1987); Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law: Responding to an Uncertain
Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1237 (1990). Cf. Comment, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-
Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986) (arguing for
insurance-based incentives to control the various risks associated with hazardous wastes).
26 See, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017
(1991); United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
27 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-14 (5th ed. 1980).
28 Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30
U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 126-131 (1980). Several other arguments explaining the rule's existence are
presented in Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cmu. L REV. 89 (1985).
According to Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, the rule also: (i) reduces costs of monitoring
management and shareholders; (ii) allows market prices to impound additional information about the value
[Vol.25:1
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holder -- Mr. Smith -- invests in X Corporation, and X Corporation later becomes
insolvent, Mr. Smith's loss is limited to the amount of his investment. Were he
faced with losing his entire fortune as a result of a relatively risky, but small,
investment, he would instead (assuming he is risk neutral) invest in cash
equivalents or some other riskless or less risky investment.
29
Furthermore, suppose Mr. Smith has substantial personal wealth in relation
to all of the other shareholders of X Corporation. In a world of unlimited
personal liability, if X Corporation is unable to pay its debts, the firm's creditors
will probably try to obtain a judgment against Smith before attempting to reach
the assets of other investors.30  As a consequence, Mr. Smith will value his
shares in X Corporation much lower than other stockholders. 31  This would
result in stock prices fluctuating from investor to investor based on personal
wealth and the likelihood of creditors' reaching the investor's personal assets.
32
In such a world, it would be virtually impossible to structure liquid securities
markets.
33
Limited shareholder liability solves these problems by encouraging private
investment by individuals without the risk of losing one's personal fortune, while
facilitating the exchange of those investments by tying the price of individual
shares to systematic and unsystematic risks, not those associated with the
peculiarities of the investor.34 The principle, however, does create some
inefficiencies, for it allows investors to reap all the gains of their investment,
while bearing only some of the losses, leaving the brunt of any such losses upon
third-party creditors of the firm in which the investor has invested.35 But the
efficiencies that are created from the principle, for the reasons discussed above,
clearly outweigh any inefficiencies that it may create.
This balance comes into question when other corporations, rather than
individuals, are shareholders.36 Corporations comprise a substantial segment of
the investment community. And they too enjoy limited liability for their
of firms; (iii) allows more efficient diversification; and (iv) facilitates optimal investment decisions. Id.
at 94-97.
29 See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHL L REV. 499, 502 (1976).
'0 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 92; Halpern, Treilcock, & Turnbull, supra note 28, at 130-3 1.
3' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 92.
32 Id.
33 id.
3 See Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, supra note 28, at 130-31.
3- Id. at 148. Even this risk of creditors, however, has been taken into account in the form of higher
interest rates. Posner, supra note 29, at 503.
36 See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations For Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L
REV. 986, 989-90 (1986).
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investments. Yet, from an economic perspective, limited liability has less
significance when applied to corporations. 37  Whereas individual investors are
likely to mitigate the potential for losses in equity investments by diversifying, 38
corporations tend to invest in individual projects that have positive net present
values.39 Since the risk of environmental liability will normally be factored into
the calculation of net present value, corporate investment in projects with positive
net present values should be socially desirable. Nonetheless, it has been
argued that limited liability of corporate shareholders does not attract needed
capital to socially desirable though risky projects, but instead encourages
inefficient investment.4' Some commentators have asserted that rather than
promote efficient investing, limited liability of corporations serves to subsidize,
and even encourage, capital outlays in projects where the total expected costs
exceed the total expected returns.42
Indeed, the case for disregarding limited liability is even stronger when
there are involuntary creditors - typically, persons who have incurred an injury
in tort.43  In the context of hazardous waste disposal, involuntary creditors
include governmental agencies, private parties harmed directly as a result of the
disposal, and those indirectly harmed - either commercially, recreationally, or
aesthetically - through damage to affected natural resources.4 Involuntary credi-
tors, as opposed to voluntary creditors, of corporations do not have the advantage
of being able to negotiate the cost of the particular risk.45 Moreover, involuntary
creditors are not in the same position as corporate investors to abate the risks of
hazardous waste disposal."
Notwithstanding these beneficial attributes, allowing creditors to reach the
assets of corporate investors possesses several intrinsic problems. By definition,
it will discourage corporate investment in risky projects whose net present values
are positive, in part because the information costs associated with the investment
will be so high that it will make calculation of the present values impossible and,
therefore, investment prohibitive, and because the risks that the corporation will
37 Id.
31 Id. at 990.
'9 Id. at 989.
40 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 97.
4' Note, supra note 36, at 990.
42 Id.
43 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 107; Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, supra note 28, at 145;
Posner, supra note 29, at 519-20; Note, supra note 36, at 991.
44 Note, supra note 36, at 991-92. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155,
157 (7th Cir. 1988).
45 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 107; Posner, supra note 29, at 520.
46 Note, supra note 36, at 995-96.
[Vol.25:1
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lose its assets - possibly to the point of insolvency - will force it to forego
investment opportunities.4 ' This is especially true if liability is imposed, as
under CERCLA, retroactively and strictly. If a corporation is unable to
calculate adequately the risks of investing in a firm that may handle hazardous
substances, then investment in these firms by corporations will cease.49
Concomitantly, the risk averse nature of corporate management will
compound this problem. As Professor John Coffee has pointed out, "[M]anagers
are inherently overinvested in the firm they serve. 50  This is so because
managers' greatest assets are their jobs,5 because compensation plans often
contain stock options and other perquisites, 52 and because managers, unlike
shareholders, may be found personally liable the corporation faces the possibility
of becoming or in fact becomes insolvent.53 Since managers cannot diversify
their assets, they will seek to diversify the corporation's portfolioi4  This they
should not do because, in theory, shareholders can diversify themselves and will
not pay a premium to have corporations in which they invest do it for them.55
Even more troublesome for purposes of the issues discussed in this article
are the specific investment decisions managers will make for their corporations
when building this diversified portfolio. Corporate finance theory maintains that
managers should ignore unsystematic (i.e., firm-specific) risks and focus
exclusively on diversiflable systematic risks when making the corporations invest-
ment decisions.56 The risk aversion of managers, however, will force them to
concentrate on the total - unsystematic and systematic - risks of the investment.5 7
Consequently, if managers indeed do look at an investment's total risks and if the
particular investment in some way handles hazardous substances, because the
unsystematic risk of CERCLA liability is incalculable, a manager will decide not
to sink funds into the particular investment opportunity.
47 See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 436.
48 Evidence of this possibility is found in the insurance industry, where the nature of pollution risks has
forced many insurance providers to opt out of pollution insurance market. See generally Abraham, supra
note 9.
49 Id.
SO Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 17
(1986); see Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L REV. 227,
318-332 (1990); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 412 (3d ed. 1986).
"' Coffee, supra note 50, at 17-18; Hu, supra note 50, at 319-20.
32 Coffee, supra note 50, at 18; Hu, supra note 50, at 320, 325, 327-29..
" Coffee, supra note 50, at 18-19.
-' Id. at 20; Hu, supra note 50, at 322-23.
" Hu, supra note 50, at 324; Note, supra note 36, at 990-91.
s See Hu, supra note 50, at 287-95, 320-22.
57 See id, at 320-22.
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Furthermore, the analyses arguing for abrogating limited liability in
situations when corporations invest do not distinguish between the publicly held
corporation and the close or small corporation.5 Persons who hold stock in
small or close corporations are often in the same position as individual inves-
tors.59 If they are subject to unlimited liability, the effects could be disas-
trous. 60 As a result, reaching the assets of these types of corporations has the
same inefficient result on investment as unlimited liability of individual investors:
diminished investment in worthwhile projects.6 '
With respect to the actual remediation of contaminated sites, the prospect
of liability does not create the incentives that are necessary to effect an
expeditious cleanup. Presumably, at least with respect to investment decisions
that were made prior to CERCLA's existence, the corporation conducted a risk
assessment of those risks associated with the subsidiary's hazardous waste
practices. In order to protect its investment, the parent probably decided to play
some type of role in these practices, to include actually providing for the cleanup
of the disposal site. However, the enactment of CERCLA and the courts'
application of the statute to ignore the rule of limited liability have resulted in the
parent now being held liable as a matter of law for making this decision. Instead
of proceeding with the cleanup of this site, the parent will combat liability
because any claim under CERCLA against it for the subsidiary's actions places
the parent's assets at risk; the claim, therefore, raises the stakes for the parent to
an unacceptable level. 62 The result is protracted litigation and little action as far
as the environment is concerned.
Thus, the economic arguments counseling in favor of parent corporation
liability under CERCLA are not as certain as one would originally believe. The
statute does cast a large net to impose liability; but, as one court has made clear,
the act also has limits. 63 In order to understand more fully the import of
unlimited parent corporation liability, it is essential to keep in mind the economic
underpinnings of limited liability, what economic effects abrogation of the rule
will have on various corporate structures and transactions, and whether dissolution
of the rule will further CERCLA's purposes.
5'8 Posner, supra note 29, at 512-13.
39 Id.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See R. POSNER, supra note 50, at 522-28.
63 Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988).
[Vo .25:1
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/3
PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY
Courts have adjudged shareholders liable for releases or threatened releases
of hazardous substances as "owners" and "operators" under two separate
provisions of section 107 of CERCLA. Section 107 (a)(1) makes current owners
and operators of a hazardous waste facility liable?6 Past owners and operators
of facilities are liable under section 107 (a)(2).65  Both subsections refer to
"owners and operators '" in the conjunctive, while section 101 - the definitional
section of CERCLA - refers to the two disjunctively as "owners or operators."
The courts that have addressed this distinction have held that either an "owner"
or "operator" may be liable for response costs, notwithstanding any inference that
can be drawn from the use of the word "and" in section 101. 67 This seems to
suggest that to be liable under section 107, an entity must be both an "owner" and
an "operator. "" The statute defines "owners or operators" in a circular fashion
as "persons" who own or operate a facility where hazardous substances are
produced, stored or disposed.69 The statute defines "person" very broadly to
include "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."70  Of
particular relevance to the issue of shareholder liability is the exception provided
under the definition of "owner or operator" specifying that the term does not
include "a person, who, without participating in the management of a... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or facility."'"
The courts that have found corporate stockholders liable as "owners" and
"operators" have done so using two methods. First, courts have held that
CERCLA itself provides for direct shareholder liability if the parent corporation
participates in some way in the management of the subsidiary that caused the
contamination.72 Second, courts have also held that corporate shareholders may
be liable indirectly under the statute for cleanup costs caused by their subsidiaries
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(1) (1988).
Id. at § 9607 (a)(2).
Id. at § 9601 (20); MeSlarrow, Jones, & Murdock, supra note 17, at 10390-91.
See McSlarrow, Jones, & Murdock, supra note 17, at 10390-91.
68 See id
9 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (1988); see also Edward Hines Lumber Co. V. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d
155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988); Oswald & Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law
Doctrine, 86 Nw. U.L. REv. 259, 269-70 (1992).
70 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (1988).
71 Id. at § 9601 (20) (A).
' See infra text accompanying notes 74-91.
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through piercing the corporate veil.73 Because significant control of the
corporation by the shareholder is an element of "veil piercing," whenever a court
relies upon the second method, it usually has either implicitly or explicitly also
relied on elements of direct liability.
This part of the article examines these issues in more detail by discussing
two cases arising out of different federal circuits. In each of these cases, the
courts were faced with a claim under CERCLA against a parent corporation for
response costs. And in each, the courts had to address whether parent corpora-
tions may be liable directly and indirectly under the Act. Yet on both issues the
courts reached opposite results. These decisions are paradigms, exemplifying a
fundamental division in the courts over the interpretation of CERCLA as it relates
to parent corporation liability, as well as a similar split regarding the cir-
cumstances under which judicial development of federal common law in
furtherance of CERCLA is permissible.
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.
In United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,4 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a district court decision holding a parent corporation liable for response
costs caused by the activities of one of its former, but dissolved, subsidiaries.
The United States sued the Kayser-Roth Corporation under section 107 of
CERCLA for removal and enforcement costs that by the EPA and the Department
of Justice had incurred in responding to contamination of a small Rhode Island
town's drinking water." The contamination was caused by Stamina Mills, Inc.,
a textile manufacturing firm. 76 From 1966 to 1977, the year Stamina Mills dis-
solved, Kayser-Roth owned all of Stamina's outstanding stock." In 1969,
Stamina began using a dry-cleaning system to scour newly-woven fabric produced
at the mill.78 The system used the chemical trichlorethylene (TCE) as a cleaning
agent.79 A combination of an isolated accidental spill on the mill's property and
of Stamina's deposit of used TCE bottoms in one of its landfills caused the
contamination of a number of wells supplying the nearby town with drinking
7 See infra text accompanying notes 92-113, 140-151.
74 724 F. Supp. 15. For other discussions of the Kayser-Roth decisions, some upon which this discussion
draws, see Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 443-460; Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation andLiability Act (CERCLA), 52 Ohio St. L.J. 133,
161-62 (1991); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 313-15; Comment, supra note 3, at 987-94. See
also Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil: Corporate Of0fcer Liability for Response Costs under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 923 (1986)
73 724 F. Supp. at 16.
7' Id. at 17.
7Id. at 18.
78 id.
79id.
[Vol.25:1
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water.80 The problem was not discovered until 1979, two years after the mill
dissolved, and was ultimately remedied by EPA.8'
The United States sued Kayser-Roth as the parent corporation of Stamina
Mills, claiming that Kayser-Roth was the "owner" and the "operator" of the mill
at the time the contamination occurred.82  According to the district court,
throughout the life of Kayser-Roth's parent-subsidiary relationship with Stamina,
Kayser-Roth exercised a significant degree of control over the mill's opera-
tions.8 3 Specifically, the district court discovered that the two companies shared
common officers; that Kayser-Roth's approval was necessary for any purchase or
movement of capital assets, for acquisition or disposal of real property, and for
borrowing money; and that Kayser-Roth controlled Stamina's fiscal affairs.s4
The only aspects of Stamina Mills' business Kayser-Roth did not control,
according to the court, were those associated with the subsidiary's day-to-day
routine activities.85
One aspect of control that the district court found especially relevant was
Kayser-Roth's authority over Stamina's environmental activities, including those
associated with the TCE dry-cleaning system.8 6  For example, Kayser-Roth
approved of the mill's use of the system after directing a cost-benefit study on its
feasibility.87 The district court also found that Kayser-Roth issued a directive
to Stamina Mills, requiring that it notify Kayser-Roth's legal department of any
correspondence with courts and governmental agencies regarding environmental
matters.88 More specifically, in 1974, Stamina sought Kayser-Roth's approval
of a settlement agreement arising out of a lawsuit by the United States against
Stamina for violations of the Clean Water Act. 9
The district court applied these findings to section 107 of CERCLA, and
determined that Kayser-Roth was an "owner" and an "operator" of Stamina, and
was therefore liable for CERCLA response costs. The district court found
liability in a manner far different from the majority of courts which have held
parent corporations liable. These courts have simply determined that the
&0 Id.
S Id.
82 Id. at 15-16.
83 Id. at 18-19.
$4 id.
" See id. at 19.
,6 See id. at 22-23.
"7 Id. at 22.
'a Id. at 23.
9 Id.
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particular shareholder was an "owner and operator" of the facility where the
contamination occurred, making no distinction between the two statutory condi-
tions.9" The district court in Kayser-Roth, however, applied section 107 literally,
noting that an "owner" is not the same as an "operator."'" Implicit in the
decision is the view that a defendant must first be identified either as an "owner"
or an "operator" to be held liable.
1. Kayser-Roth and Direct Liability of Parent Corporation
The first issue the district court considered was Kayser-Roth's liability as
an "operator." In analyzing this issue, the district court discussed two theories
that other courts have advanced in holding shareholders liable pursuant to section
107. Under both theories, in order to find that a federal statute makes sharehold-
ers directly liable for certain actions, the statute must evince congressional intent
to disregard the rule of limited liability.92 Courts employing the first theory find
that a defendant is, conjunctively, an "owner and operator" within the meaning
of the Act.93 In doing so, the courts adhere to the confusing intermingling of the
conceptions of "ownership" and "operation," as the two are used in defining an
"owner and operator" under the statute.94
For example, the courts that employ the first theory find it significant that
the definition of "owner and operator" excludes "a person who, without
participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the . . . facility."95 Reasoning by
implication, the courts conclude that a share of stock may constitute "indicia of
ownership" to protect a security interest in a facility and, therefore, one who owns
(i.e., "owner") such stock may be liable as an "owner and operator" as long as
that entity exercises operational control (i.e., "operator") to some extent over the
facility. Turning to the specific activities of a particular defendant, courts
applying the first theory examine the level of control the shareholder exercised
over the polluting corporation. If the shareholder in any way exercised control
over the contaminating activities of the corporation, the court will find the
" See, e.g., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
"' 724 F. Supp. at 23.
9 See id. at 19-20.
93 See id. at 20-21. See also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
affd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the two theories of direct liability under CERCLA
of parent corporations).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (1988).
"5 See 724 F. Supp. at 20, and the cases cited therein.
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shareholder liable under section 107.96
The second theory ignores this jumble of "ownership" and "operation" and
focuses simply on whether the parent corporation exercised any control over the
subsidiary generally and, if so, whether the parent actually controlled or had the
capacity to control the management and operations of the activities causing the
pollution.97 It appears, therefore, that the courts using the this theory look at the
"operational" aspects of the parent's relationship with its subsidiary. "Ownership"
is either assumed or irrelevant to the courts' ultimate decision.
The district court in Kayser-Roth identified a number of factors that other
courts have employed in finding a shareholder liable under this theory: whether
the shareholders could have discovered in a timely manner the release or
threatened release; whether the shareholder "had the power to direct the
mechanisms causing the release;" and, finally, whether the person had the
authority to prevent or alleviate damages caused by the release. 9
In Kayser-Roth, the district court applied the second theory to the parent's
activities.99 Before applying the specific factors identified above, however, the
district court examined the control Kayser-Roth exerted generally over the
business of Stamina Mills and determined that its control was "pervasive.
'it10
The district court then turned to the specific issue of Kayser-Roth's control over
Stamina Mills' environmental affairs and found that Kayser-Roth had the power
to control releases of TCE, the power to direct the use of TCE, and the power to
prevent and abate damages."' The court also noted Kayser-Roth's approval of
the scouring system, and its directive to Stamina that Stamina notify Kayser-
Roth's lawyers of any governmental contact concerning environmental mat-
ters. 102  Examining all of these factors together, the court determined that
Kayser-Roth was the de facto operator of Stamina Mills' textile operation, as well
as of Stamina's scouring system. 03 Accordingly, the district court deemed
Kayser-Roth strictly liable as an "operator" pursuant to section 107 for all
96 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Oswald &
Schipani, supra note 69, at 269-70.
"' See, 724 F. Supp. at 21; Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 E.L.R. 20578 (D. Colo. 1987). See also
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
98 724 F. Supp. at 21.
99 Id. at 22-23.
'00 Id. at 22.
"I' Id. at 22-23.
102 Id.
-o' Id. at 23.
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response costs the United States incurred. 1°4
2. Kayser-Roth and Indirect Shareholder Liability: Piercing
the Corporate Veil
The next issue the district court in Kayser-Roth addressed was the parent
corporation's liability under section 107 as an "owner.'' 05 All shareholders are
"owners" in a very general sense. But CERCLA does not impose liability on
shareholders specifically. Following the lead taken by several other courts, '6
the Kayser-Roth district court determined that stockholders may be liable
derivatively as owners through the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil." 7
CERCLA does not explicitly contemplate the imputation of shareholder
liability, nor is there a general federal statute authorizing corporate veil piercing.
Nonetheless, the district court in Kayser-Roth held that courts may employ federal
common law under CERCLA to pierce the corporate veil, if necessary to further
the interests of "public convenience, fairness, and equity."' '  The court
determined that in order to establish such liability under CERCLA, one must
conclude that the statute places no particular importance on the corporate form,
and that piercing the veil would further CERCLA's remedial purpose." 9 Once
this finding is made, the courts must apply certain factors to determine whether
the parent's veil should be pierced. 10 The specific factors, which federal courts
have developed under federal common law, parallel those commonly applied
under state law: inadequate capitalization of the corporation given its purposes;
substantial shareholder control over the corporation; intermingling of the
shareholder's property and accounts with the corporation's; failure on the part of
the corporation to adhere to corporate formalities; failure by the corporation to
maintain adequate records; and the existence of corporate officers or directors
possessing little or no responsibility over the corporation's affairs."1
The district court in Kayser-Roth found that CERCLA's sweeping language,
coupled with its purpose of cleaning up hazardous substance disposal sites in an
expeditious manner, demonstrated congressional intent that the Act "places no
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1200-02 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).
'07 724 F. Supp 15, 23.
log Id.
109 Id.
"o Id. at 23-24.
11 See id.
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special importance upon the corporate structure."" 2 The district court then
examined again Kayser-Roth's control over Stamina Mills, considering essentially
the same factors it had surveyed in holding Kayser-Roth liable as an operator.
The district court declared that the corporation's veil should be pierced, not only
because public convenience, fairness, and equity dictated such a result, but also
because Kayser-Roth exercised substantial control over Stamina Mills as "in fact
and deed, an owner."
113
Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co.
Compared to the majority of judicial decisions addressing this issue, the
district court's decision in Kayser-Roth contains a detailed examination of the
reasons for holding a parent corporation liable under CERCLA for contamination
caused by a subsidiary. Indeed, on appeal the First Circuit described the opinion
as "excellent. 114 Nonetheless, like most of the courts that have found parent
corporations liable under CERCLA, the district court in Kayser-Roth relied too
heavily on the draconian effect of CERCLA generally, rather than on the Act's
express statutory scheme, and did not consider what consequences unlimited
liability may have on corporate activity. These problems are further illuminated
by contrasting the district court decision in Kayser-Roth with the district and
appellate court opinions in Joslyn Corp. v. TL. James & Co." 5 The Joslyn
courts took contrary positions on the issues the district court addressed in Kayser-
Roth, and their decisions clearly demonstrate the inherent problems with Kayser-
Roth and with the entire notion of parent corporation liability under CERCLA.
In Joslyn, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court decision declining to find a corporate shareholder liable under CERCLA.
The case involved a wood treating firm located in Louisiana, known as the
Lincoln Creosoting Company, Inc." 6  The company was founded in 1935 by
three men: Messrs. Tooke, Hayes, and James.1 7 Mr. James provided the initial
capital for Lincoln in return for sixty percent of the voting stock, and all two
hundred shares of Lincoln's non-voting preferred stock; Mr. Tooke and Mr. Hayes
purchased the remaining forty percent of the two hundred shares of voting
stock."1 Upon the purchase of the stock, the three shareholders endorsed all
"' Id. at 24.
113 Id.
114 Id.
' 910 F.2d at 27.
16 Joslyn Mfg. Co., 696 F. Supp. at 222.
"I Id. at 227.
I' d.
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shares to T. L. James & Co." 9 As a result, T. L. James & Co. controlled one
hundred percent of Lincoln's outstanding stock. Yet, despite the substantial
financial control the shareholders had over Lincoln, the corporation was, for all
intents and purposes, run as an independent entity120 In fact, several individu-
als completely unaffiliated with T. L. James & Company were the principal
managers of Lincoln."'
Lincoln was organized to conduct creosoting operations and all of its
business took place at a single plant. 22 During the fifteen years of Lincoln's
formal existence, the company's chemical recovery system allowed wood treating
chemicals to drip into a sump pit.123 Although Lincoln attempted to recover the
chemicals, some were discharged into an open ditch and later flowed into a
slough. 24 In 1950, Lincoln sold its plant to Joslyn Manufacturing Company,
which owned and operated the facility until 1969, when Koppers Company, Inc.
purchased the operation. 25 After the acquisition in 1969 and until the case was
ultimately filed, at least seven other entities owned the plant property in whole
or in part.
2
Upon discovery of the contamination caused by the creosoting chemicals,
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ordered Joslyn and several
additional persons to clean up the contaminated areas. 27 Joslyn, in turn, sued
T. L. James & Co., as well as others, claiming that the company was an "owner"
and an "operator" of the plant at the time of the creosoting chemicals' dis-
charge, 128 and was therefore liable to Joslyn under section 107 of CERCLA for
response costs. 29 More particularly, Joslyn argued that T.L. James & Co. was
directly liable as an "owner and operator" under section 107 (making no
distinction between the status of the two). 3 ° Unlike the courts in Kayser-Roth,
however, both the district and the appellate courts rejected the argument that a
parent corporation can be directly liable.
Id. at 228.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 228-29.
122 id.
'23 893 F.2d at 81.
I ? Id.
125 Id.
'26 Id. at 82.
127 id.
'm 696 F. Supp. at 224.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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The district court held that parent corporations cannot be "owners and
operators" for purposes of CERCLA."' The court concluded that in enacting
CERCLA, Congress did not authorize courts to ignore the corporate form in order
to find liability.'32 Consequently, parent corporations, which enjoy limited
liability under state law, are protected from direct CERCLA liability. The district
court based its conclusion on several prior federal court opinions133 holding that
Congress must make it clear in a particular statute when it intends to create an
exception to the state law principle of limited liability. Absent such an explicit
statement of congressional intent, courts are not to abrogate the principle of
limited liability. In Joslyn, the district court found nothing in CERCLA affecting
the limited liability of shareholders; 34 it was not about to create such a
rule. 35
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 36 It also found nothing in the
language of CERCLA evincing an intent on the part of Congress to alter so
fundamental a rule of corporation law as limited liability. 37 Even evidence of
such intent in the legislative history of the statute, said the court, was not
enough.131 If Congress had wanted to make shareholders liable, it should have
done so expressly. 39
Joslyn also argued that liability should be imputed upon the James
Company through piercing the corporate veil.14° Joslyn brought to the district
court's attention several indicia of James's control over Lincoln, asserting that
Lincoln had no identity of its own.' 4' Analyzing this argument, the district
court hypothesized that a parent corporation may be held liable for contamination
caused by its subsidiary, through piercing the corporate veil under federal
common law.' 42 In making this conclusion, the court stated that the threshold
issue is whether state or federal law provides the controlling rule of decision.
143
The district court found that in this instance, federal common law governed
131 id.
132 id.
133 Id. 225-26.
'3 Id. at 226.
3 See id.
13 893 F.2d at 82-83.
07 Id.
133 Id.
139 Id.
'" 696 F. Supp. at 230.
141 Id. at 230-31.
142 Id. at 226-27.
14' id. at 226.
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because it was necessary to fill in the interstices of a federal statute.'"
Ultimately, however, the district court concluded that it made no real
difference which body of law was controlling, because the federal common law
standards for piercing the corporate veil include those under state law: 145 shared
stock ownership, directors or officers, business departments; consolidated financial
statements and tax returns; substantial capital input by the parent; incorporation
of the subsidiary by the parent; inadequate capitalization of the subsidiary; salaries
and expenses of the subsidiary paid by the parent; the parent is the only source
of the subsidiary's business; use of the subsidiary's property by the parent as its
own; inseparable operations of the two companies; and inobservance by the
subsidiary of corporate formalities.'46 Applying these criteria to the facts
surrounding the relationship between Lincoln and T.L. James & Co., the district
court determined that Lincoln's veil should not be pierced. 47 The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the district court's finding, 148 but added a caveat 49 to which the
lower court had only alluded. 50 The circuit court held that under CERCLA,
[v]eil piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used
as a sham to perpetuate a fraud or avoid personal liability."''
AN ANALYSIS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LIABILITY
WrrH JOSLYN AS A GUIDE
In my opinion, the Joslyn decisions are correct as a matter of law. Direct
parent corporation liability pursuant to section 107 cannot be sustained. The only
way courts may find parent corporations accountable under the Act is by piercing
the corporate veil, and only then when the parent shareholder used the subsidia-
ry's corporate form for fraudulent or protective purposes. Viewed in light of
Joslyn, those court opinions holding parent corporations liable directly and
indirectly are flawed in at least two respects. Foremost, as a purely legal matter,
the courts have construed CERCLA too liberally in finding direct liability, and
have not properly articulated the situations in which indirect liability should be
triggered. Additionally, these courts have failed to consider the policy implica-
tions, especially the economic effects, associated with corporate shareholder
liability.
144 Id.
14 Id.
'4 Id. at 227.
'7 id. at 231.
'" 893 F.2d at 83.
14 Id.
15 Id.
151 Id.
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The First Level of Criticism: The Law
1. Direct Liability
Courts holding parent corporations liable under section 107 of CERCLA
have done so by relying almost exclusively on the statute's remedial nature.
Through the accepted canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be interpreted liberally,5 2 the courts have turned to the generic federal
interests embodied in CERCLA's text and history, that is, to provide a federal
solution to a nationwide problem by promoting the expeditious cleanup of
hazardous sites and by ensuring that those responsible for contamination bear the
costs of the cleanup, in order to find that the statute covers parent corporations
for contamination caused by their subsidiaries.
53
Indeed, judicial reliance on the remedial design of CERCLA and the federal
interest associated with that design in order to hold parent corporations liable is
necessary for at least two reasons: First, CERCLA itself does not specifically
make parent corporations liable. Rather, the Act contains only very general
language defining those persons who may be liable. Second, evidence in the
Act's legislative history indicating that Congress intended to sweep parent
corporations into section 107's net is scant. Because CERCLA's language and
history, standing alone, do not provide specific direction, the courts turn to more
general evidence for help. For example, in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,'- which is one of the seminal cases concerning
parent corporation liability and one upon which the district court in Kayser-Roth
relied extensively,"'5 the lower court looked at the general definition of "owner
and operator" and construed its language to include parent corporations based on
the statute's general purposes. 56  Several other courts have reached similar
conclusions."'
But there are incongruous qualities associated with the broad federal
interests CERCLA personifies, and how those interests relate to direct liability of
parent corporations. When it enacted CERCLA, Congress intended to provide an
effective federal response to the problems associated with sites contaminated with
152 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBuC PoLIcY 656-57 (1988).
'3 United States v. Kayser Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 23 (D.R.I. 1989), affd. 910 F.2d (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
'" 579 F. Supp. at 823
' 724 F. Supp. at 20, 22, 23.
's 579 F. Supp at 848.
See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
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hazardous substances. To the extent that a parent corporation can limit its
exposure through the corporate form and thereby avoid the clean up of contami-
nated sites, the statute's efficacy is undermined. Further, if liability depends upon
the state in which the parent corporation is incorporated, then it may also be
argued that CERCLA's goal of providing a nationwide rule governing liability is
undermined.
Recognizing these pragmatic concerns, courts have imposed liability
directly on parent corporations if they can establish that those corporations have
in some way personally engaged in the subsidiary's activities. This holding is
necessary, say these courts, to assure that any loopholes in the statute which
would enable parent corporations to avoid liability are closed, and to ensure that
CERCLA damages are borne by parties who have sufficient resources to address
the underlying hazardous substances problem. By interpreting CERCLA broadly
to cover parents, these courts hold that they are furthering CERCLA's remedial
objective.
By contrast, derogation of a fundamental principle of corporation law, such
as limited shareholder liability, without explicit congressional authorization is
problematic on both legal and pragmatic grounds. When courts turn to the
remedial design of CERCLA and the federal interests related to that design to do
away with the principle, their action flies in the face of the maxim that statutes
in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. According to this
rule, Congress must be explicit if it intends to derogate an accepted common law
principle.158 If Congress is not explicit, then it is presumed that the common
law rule remains. 59 Although it is arguable whether limited liability originated
in the common law,' 60 it is accepted that the tenet is so fundamental to our
notion of the corporation that regardless of its centuries-old roots, it cannot be
disgarded statutorily without an explicit intent on the part of the legislature to do
so. If it is true that in the field of corporate law, Congress enacts laws "against
the background of existing state laws,' 6' then it follows that Congress should
be explicit if it intends to ignore the doctrine of limited liability for a specific
statute such as CERCLA.
In addition, from a practical perspective, if a parent corporation participates
' 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTITUTION § 61.01, at 77-78 (N. Singer
4th ed. 1984).
159 Joslyn Manufacturing Company, 893 F.2d at 82-83; SUTHERLAND, supra note 158, at § 61.01, at 77-78.
"o It has been argued, however, that the doctrine is statutory in origin; referring to it as a common law
rule, therefore, is incorrect. Heidt, supra note 74, at 159-60. Assuming without argument that Professor
Heidt is correct, I believe that her point is so technical, given the doctrine's elementary role in our concept
of what a corporation is, that I do not think it necessarily calls the canon that the court used in Joslyn into
question.
'6' Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
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in the management of its subsidiary but does not intend to avoid CERCLA
liability through the subsidiary's corporate form, there is no immediately apparent
reason to do away with the rule of limited liability and thereby infringe upon an
area of significant state interests. 62 This is especially true in cases like Kayser-
Roth and Joslyn, in which there is no evidence that the parent's influence over the
subsidiary's acts was unreasonable or directly contributed to the problems
stemming from the subsidiary corporation's hazardous waste practices.
Despite the incongruity associated with the federal interests embodied in
CERCLA, the decisions holding parent corporations liable under section 107 have
addressed only one side of the story: they have centered on the general language
of CERCLA and the generic federal interests associated with the statute as
guidance rather than the Act's explicit text to formulate a blanket rule that the
statute imposes liability directly on parent corporations if the parents in some way
participated in their subsidiaries' contamination-causing activities. By doing so,
the decisions have failed to explain in a principled way why an elementary rule
of state corporation law should be generally discarded under a federal statutory
scheme even if there was no illicit intent on the part of a parent.' 63 This limited
focus has resulted in opinions with little statutory analysis, the outcomes of which
appear to be predetermined.164
As explained in Kayser-Roth, the courts have used two legal theories to
impose liability on parent corporations under section 107.65 The first theory
centers on the language of the Act and whether stockholders are included as
PRPs under section 107. Courts adopting this theory initially conclude that the
terms "owner or operator" and "person" are sufficiently broad to include
shareholders and parent corporation. As indicated above, these courts buttress
their conclusions based on what they envision Congress intended CERCLA to
accomplish. Next, they determine that the exception for persons not participating
in the management of a facility in the definition of "owner or operator" implies
that an owning stockholder who manages the subsidiary corporation is liable
under CERCLA as an owner or operator."
Each of these conclusions under the first theory is vulnerable to interpretive
attack. The words "shareholder" or "parent corporation" do not appear in the
" See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 461-64 (proposing a more stringent standard than that set
forth by the courts).
163 See Comment, supra note 3, at 995-1000, where the author reaches the same conclusion in the context
of indirect liability. But see Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 301-15, where the authors conclude
that "[a]nalysis of the case law simply does not support a conclusion that the courts are eroding traditional
corporate liability rules regarding parent corporations in the CERCLA context." Id. at 315.
'"See id. at 996 (discussing indirect liability).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 93-104.
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statutory definitions of "owner and operator" and of "person." It appears entirely
inappropriate to conclude from these terms without something more that Congress
intended to waive the rule of limited liability that would ordinarily apply. In
response, these courts would probably say that the "something more" is the
remedial design of CERCLA and Congress' intent that the statute be read
liberally. Fifty separate rules of limited liability could undermine CERCLA's
remedial objectives, rendering consistency of application of the statute impossi-
ble.'6 This conclusion, however, is overbroad. There are nuances attributable
to particular state versions of the rule,'67 but there are general principles of
limited liability that can be extrapolated and applied fairly consistently regardless
of the local rule.
1 61
If one looks at the doctrine of limited liability more generally, it becomes
evident that by holding parent corporations liable directly under CERCLA the
courts are doing more than furthering the statute's remedial purposes: they are
altering at the most fundamental level a traditional feature of corporation law.
Shareholders, including parent corporations, are presumed to not be personally
liable for claims against the corporations in which they have invested. Concur-
rently, by ignoring the limited liability of the parent, the courts ignore the separate
existence of the subsidiary. 169 Each of these concepts is basic to the entire
notion of the corporate entity. Although Congress is free at any time to modify
the historical rules of corporation law, if it does, it should do so expressly. 7 '
Absent such an expression, however, the existing rules should remain; courts
should not be free to modify fundamental concepts by relying on generic federal
interests associated with a particular statute. Allowing the courts to dissolve the
rule of limited liability without specific congressional direction serves to
undermine the law's predictability, "rendering consistency of application hostage
to the supposed significance of the policy urging the [rule's] abandonment.' ' 7'
The courts' reliance on the exception set forth in the definition of "owners
and operators" relating to persons participating in the management of a facility
is similarly misplaced. The exception applies to any person, who does not
participate in a vessel or facility's management, who holds indicia of ownership
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. Stock is, of course, indicia
of ownership; and it is a security. But is stock indicia of ownership to protect a
security interest in property? An affirmative answer seems to stretch the words
166 See Heidt, supra note 74, at 185-88.
167 Id. at 185-86.
1" See, e.g., Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 294-97.
169 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 435-36.
170 Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 82-83.
17' Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 436.
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to their breaking point. Stock is more of an ownership interest than a security
interest. Consequently, a more reasonable interpretation of this provision is that
it was intended to protect secured creditors holding liens on vessels transporting
hazardous materials or facilities where hazardous substances are generated. This
construction of the exception comports with several court decisions that have
applied it in analyzing the liability of secured creditors under CERCLA. 72
The second theory of direct parent liability, the one used by the district
court in Kayser-Roth, focuses upon the acts of the particular parent corporation
and the relationship of those acts to the ordinary meaning of "operator."173 The
determination whether the parent corporation qualifies as an "operator" hinges
upon the pervasiveness of the parent corporation's control over the management
and operation of the polluting subsidiary, and whether that control extended to the
actions causing the pollution. If both aspects of control are present, then the
parent is deemed an "operator" for purposes of section 107.
Like the first theory, this theory suffers from its failure to address
adequately parent corporation liability based on the express language of the
statute. There is nothing in the legislation that authorizes courts to flout the
principle of limited liability or suggests that Congress intended this result. If
CERCLA does not authorize abrogation of the rule, then it should remain. Any
other conclusion results in an unprincipled judicial encroachment upon a basic
feature of corporation law.
2. Indirect Liability
Although courts may not rely upon the generic federal interests embodied
in CERCLA and its history to find that the Act itself makes parent corporations
liable, reliance on those interests is appropriate when applied to indirect liability
of parents. Indirect liability in this context means, of course, court-created federal
common law to fill the interstices of CERCLA. The Supreme Court has held that
federal courts may engage in federal common law making in two instances: first,
when the federal statute expressly authorizes courts to develop federal common
law, or when the statute does so implicitly by expressly adopting state law as the
rule of decision; or, second, when the federal interests the statute embodies, either
in its language, history, or both, would be usurped in particular instances unless
"n See generally Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's
Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1991).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
Summer, 19911
23
King: Parent Corporation Liability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
AKRON LAW REvIEw
the courts engaged in the creation of federal common law. 74
Applying these principles to the creation of a federal veil piercing doctrine
under CERCLA, one discovers that the first ground for developing federal
common law does not apply because CERCLA is silent on the issue. The second
situation, however, is applicable. As noted above, the federal interests personified
in the Act are clear: to provide a national solution to a nationwide problem by
ensuring that hazardous waste disposal sites are cleaned up, and that the costs of
the cleanups are borne by those responsible for the contamination.175 If the
corporate form is being used to contravene these federal interests, then courts
should not allow the loophole to remain. Further, the uncertainty that would arise
if courts adopted state corporation law to fill the gaps left in CERCLA militates
in favor of a generalized federal common law doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil. 176 In such a situation, courts may engage in interstitial federal common
law making.
If courts are authorized to develop federal common law of veil piercing
under CERCLA, then issues arise concerning the proper elements of this common
law principle and the circumstances under which it should be employed. 17 7 As
a general rule, a corporation's veil will be pierced either when the subsidiary is
a mere instrument -- the "alter ego" -- of the parent, or when there is evidence
that the subsidiary was formed out of an illegal or improper motive. In the
specific context of CERCLA, the elements of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil should be an amalgam of both of the theories: domination by the
parent over the subsidiary's environmental activities, with the parent's intent to
further some improper purpose related to those activities. This two-pronged
approach ensures that CERCLA's remedial objectives are satisfied by its focus on
the parent's involvement in and motivations with respect to the subsidiary's
environmental affairs. Yet it also ensures that the parent's veil is not pierced
casually, based on CERCLA's generic design, but in discrete circumstances in
which the parent's design was to engage in the subsidiary's hazardous waste
practices for its own personal benefit, knowing full well that there were negative
consequences associated with those practices.
Using this two-pronged approach, courts should first determine whether the
174 See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P.
MisuKm, & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 935-
50 (1988); see also Note, Piercing The Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
'" United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 23 (D.R.L 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (lst Cir.
1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
116 Note, supra note 170, at 861-64.
'" See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 461-62. See also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 301-
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parent exercised substantial domination over the subsidiary's environmental
affairs. Although the focus is on the environment, an examination of the parent's
domination in this area will probably reveal more. That is, if the parent was able
to and did exert substantial domination over the actions resulting in contamina-
tion, then it is likely that the parent's dominance pervaded over all of the
subsidiary's activities. Conversely, it is doubtful that the parent could exercise
such control over only one segment of its subsidiary's operations without having
similar control over all the subsidiary's affairs. Nonetheless, the focus remains
on the environment for the courts' development of a federal common law of veil
piercing is in furtherance of an environmental statute only, not in order to create
a rule of general applicability. The factors a court should look to in determining
whether there is total domination of the subsidiary are those typically used in veil
piercing cases, such as those the courts enumerated in Joslyn.178
Then, under the second prong, courts should determine whether, with
substantial participation by the parent, there has been a direct violation of
CERCLA by the subsidiary, or in situations arising before the enactment of
CERCLA, an intended imposition of external costs onto third parties in the form
of pollution caused by the parent through its subsidiary. 179  As the court of
appeals alluded to in Joslyn, judicial employment of the veil piercing doctrine
under CERCLA should be limited in most instances to situations in which the
parent has attempted to perpetuate a fraud or avoid personal liability. 80 Other
than in Joslyn, however, such a showing has not been necessary thus far in the
courts' CERCLA veil piercing holdings. 81 Rather, the courts have pierced the
veils of corporations under CERCLA in order to further "public convenience,
fairness, and equity" without a requisite showing of some illicit or otherwise
wrongful intent either to avoid statutory liability or to thrust external costs onto
third parties on the part of the parent company.'2 Use of this "public conve-
nience" standard provides no guidance in determining the circumstances under
which the separate existence of the subsidiary should be ignored in the CERCLA
context. If "public convenience" is the only normative consideration courts are
'n 696 F. Supp. at 227.
' Professors Oswald and Schipani maintain that the court of appeals in Joslyn was too restrictive in
setting forth situations when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil. Oswald & Schiparni, supra note
69, at 307. Of course, if piercing the corporate veil in the absence of CERCLA is otherwise appropriate,
such as when there has been no fraud but there is such a continuity of interest that the subsidiary is the
"alter ego" of the parent, then I would agree that Joslyn's holding is too narrow. Nonetheless, I maintain
that the courts have strained to pierce the veils of parents in the CERCLA context simply because of the
sweeping nature generally of the statute. I do not agree that parents' veils have been pieced under
CERCLA in situations in which it was indeed otherwise appropriate.
"0 893 F.2d at 83; accord, Comment, supra note 3, at 996-98. For a contrary position, see Oswald &
Schipani, supra note 69, at 301-15.
' See Comment, supra note 3, at 994-1000. But see Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 301-05.
"o Comment, supra note 3, at 994-1000.
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to employ, then parents would be liable in nearly every instance.
Further, without examining whether there was an improper motive by the
parent, or at least some culpable conduct that would otherwise justify imposing
liability under traditional veil piercing doctrine, courts are piercing parents' veils
pursuant to a federal common law that is much different from that which courts
have developed under other federal statutes. Before piercing corporate veils in
furtherance of a particular federal statute, courts have typically found culpable
conduct or improper motive by the parent to avoid the statute's restrictions.
Under CERCLA, however, the courts have developed a less stringent rule.'
83
They have looked to the broad federal purposes of CERCLA and based on those
purposes they conclude that the statute places no particular importance on the
corporate form. With those conclusions in hand, the courts have found parents
liable if the parents exercised any control over the subsidiary's enviommental
activities. No improper intent or culpable conduct is apparently necessary because
of the strict liability provisions of CERCLA. The result is a novel, sweeping
approach to veil piercing under federal common law.
Another aspect of the courts' utilization of CERCLA's broad purposes to
pierce parents' veils concerns its effect on the states' historic governance over
corporations. That is, by using lesser standards to pierce veils in furtherance of
CERCLA. The courts are creating a new strain of general federal veil piercing
authoirty.18 4 However, since states are generally reluctant to allow corporate
veils to be pierced, the federal courts' employment of lesser standards in the
furtherance of the remedial purposes of CERCLA creates an apparent tension
between state and federal interests. This tension is mitigated if courts refrain
from undue reliance on the "public convenience" standard and instead, pursuant
to the two-pronged approach set forth above, focus on whether there was any
intent on the part of the parent to avoid personal liability or to benefit from its
polluting activities at the expense of third-parties. If culpable conduct or some
improper intent on the part of the parent is required in order for the subsidiary
corporation's veil to be pierced pursuant to CERCLA, then the federal common
law of veil piercing liability begins to look more like that appearing under state
law. Thus, by requiring such a showing (in addition to a presentation of other
evidence demonstrating why the subsidiary's veil should be pierced), the two-
pronged test for veil piercing ensures that state regulation of corporations is not
unduly usurped. Furthermore, the federal interests associated with CERCLA are
quite acute when the corporate form was or is used to avoid the statute, or, before
the enactment of CERCLA, when the parent corporation intentionally imposed
external costs onto third parties that it did not intend to internalize. Piercing the
183 Id.
184 Id.
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corporate veil in scenarios like this furthers the federal statutory interests at stake,
while at the same time narrowing the federal intrusion on state corporation law.
The Second Level of Criticism: Policy
There are a number of pragmatic difficulties inherent in both direct and
indirect parent corporation liability under CERCLA. Specifically, allowing the
rule of limited liability to dissolve carries with it, as I mentioned earlier in the
article, certain economic inefficiencies. The possibility of liability presents
corporate stockholders with disincentives that did not exist prior the judiciary's
abrogation of the rule. These disincentives in turn do not promote the expeditious
cleanups that Congress designed CERCLA to accomplish. This part of the article
attempts to further illuminate some of the economic consequences that direct and
indirect liability of parents, as the two have been employed by the majority of the
courts, have introduced.
Foremost, unlimited liability pursuant to CERCLA will discourage future
investment in firms and ventures that in some way handle hazardous substances.
Corporations, through management, invest in those firms and ventures with
positive net present values." 5 Because managers are, as a rule, risk averse,86
in order for them to decide to invest assets of the corporation into another firm,
they must be able to forecast the risks (typically through the discount rate)
associated with the particular investment. If those risks are incalculable or if they
are so high that they approach infinity, then the corporation will not invest unless
it can procure insurance to guard against the identified risks. But, as noted earli-
er, insurance is generally unavailable to cover pollution liability. As a conse-
quence, corporate investment in firms that handle hazardous substance will not
occur.
A useful analogy is found in the insurance market itself. Insurers specialize
in calculating risks. If the risks cannot be calculated, insurers will not provide
coverage for those risks. Pollution liability under CERCLA is just such a
risk; 8 7 the information costs are prohibitive because of the retroactive, strict,
and joint and several nature of CERCLA liability.' 8 These variables make any
risk calculation impossible. 9 As a result, insurers, by and large, no longer
provide insurance for hazardous waste activities. 90 If the specter of CERCLA
"* See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
' Abraham, supra note 8, at 955-56.
'"See id. at 956-60.
M Id.
9' Id. at 944.
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liability does the same to investments as it has to the availability of insurance,
then the availability of needed capital in many markets will be severely curtailed.
But what of the corporation that has already invested in a subsidiary, either
before CERCLA's enactment or after its enactment but before the recent tide of
judicial extensions of it to parents? There are a number of inefficient conse-
quences if CERCLA liability is thrust into these preexisting relationships. To
simplify matters, the following analysis concentrates on parent investments in
subsidiaries that were made before CERCLA was on the books.' 91 To be more
specific, suppose a corporation, before 1980, invested capital in a subsidiary
corporation. The parent determined that the subsidiary possessed a positive net
present value. If the corporation was correct, then the investment was socially
desirable. As part of the corporation's risk assessment, it may have recognized
the problems, particularly in tort, 192 associated with the subsidiary's hazardous
waste practices. In order to mitigate those risks, it is reasonable to conclude that
the parent will play a part in the subsidiary's decision-making concerning these
substances. Indeed, the parent must do so in order to obtain the return it expected
on its investment.
93
The injection of CERCLA liability, however, upsets the corporation's
original calculation of the subsidiary's net present value. With respect to a parent
corporation's decision to invest, CERCLA liability exacts an added cost (which
was unknown or unknowable), ex post, into the parent's risk assessment of the
subsidiary. This, in essence, serves to reprove what at the time was a socially
desirable investment. To further compound the parent corporation's predicament,
its involvement in the subsidiary's environmental affairs is highly relevant, if not
dispositive, in being found both directly and indirectly liable under the stat-
ute. 94  Thus, if, as part of its original present value calculation, the parent
decided to mitigate the risks associated with the subsidiary's pollution-causing
activities by playing a greater role in decisions affecting those activities and
'9' Whether parent corporations could have forecast the imposition of liability in late 1980, soon after
CERCLA's enactment, but before the judicial applications of the statute to parents is a difficult question.
As the reader can obviously gather, I maintains that they could not have because the Act, by its terms,
does not contemplate parents, simply by being parents, as PRPs. Thus, the critical time after which
corporations realistically began factoring potential CERCLA liability into their investment calculations
was probably somewhere around the 1984-86 time period: when the courts began extending CERCLA
liability to parents. For purposes of this analysis, therefore, the situations when a parent invested before
1980 and before 1984-86 are essentially the same. However, as evidenced by the several courts that have
found parents to be PRPs under section 107, there are many who would disagree with this conclusion.
' One exception to the investment situations discussed in the previous note is that when a corporation
made its investment calculation after 1980, but before 1984-86, it also plugged possible CERCLA liability
of the subsidiary, to the extent it was calculable, into the equation.
' Professors Oswald and Schipani would argue, however, that this involvement will probably result in
veil piercing under the alter ego theory. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 69, at 301-15.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 99-113.
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thereby protecting its investment, that involvement will in all likelihood now
trigger direct or indirect CERCLA liability.
Therefore, if a subsidiary has caused a release or a threatened release of
hazardous substances in contravention of section 107, the parent must face
personal liability. Indeed, the imposition of CERCLA liability may force the
parent to pay twice for the subsidiary's actions: 195 once for the diminished value
in the subsidiary's stock and again for response costs under section 107.96
And, as already noted, the parent cannot protect itself against these costs through
insurance; insurance providers have opted out of the pollution liability mar-
ket. 97 In order to guard against this twofold effect, the parent corporation must
choose among several courses of action, all of which are undesirable from a
societal standpoint.
As an example, although the parent may be able to take some actions to
abate the contamination, it cannot because its further participation in the
subsidiary's environmental problems will exacerbate any defense the parent may
have against liability. Instead, the parent will seek to prevent liability, or mitigate
its impact, through restructuring its relationship with the subsidiary or through
combating, rather than settling, any section 107 claims against it. In this regard,
the parent may sell all of its shares in the subsidiary. But since its actions to
mitigate the risks caused by the subsidiary's environmental activities are probably
enough to trigger liability in and of themselves, divestment offers no sanctuary.
A more likely course for the parent is to hold onto the stock, but
aggressively resist liability. Since the costs of CERCLA remediation costs are
enormous, coupled with the fact that these costs cannot be passed onto insurers
but, instead, must be absorbed by the parent, CERCLA liability raises stakes for
the parent to an unacceptable level.198 Simply stated, the parent's assets, and
possibly its viability, are now at risk. The parent will resist settling any such
claim and, instead, will run the gauntlet of protracted litigation.'99 This will
further delay expeditious cleanup.
Another inefficient effect of parent liability concerns the fact that the
judiciary's application of unlimited CERCLA liability does not distinguish
between the large and small parent corporation. Direct liability under section 107
affects sole proprietorships, partnerships, close corporations, and large corpora-
'9 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 437.
196 Id.
197 Abraham, supra note 8, at 944.
I See R. POSNER, supra note 50, at 522-528.
'99 See id
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tions alike. But what if a small or close corporation invests in another firm that
causes the incurrence of CERCLA response costs? Should that corporation, if it
played a personal role in the action resulting in the pollution, be likewise liable?
Under the Kayser-Roth analysis the answer is yes: the corporation is liable
directly as an "operator," and possibly indirectly as an "owner." This analysis,
however, ignores the realities of the situation in favor of the structure of the
corporation. As Judge Richard Posner has argued, disregarding the corporate
entity to reach the assets of a close or a small corporation has the same inefficient
effect on investment that unlimited liability of individual investor exhibits?'
Investors in these corporations typically do not have the same opportunities to
diversify as individuals who invest in publicly held corporations.20 ' To illus-
trate, if investors satisfy their claims against a particular corporation through the
assets of a close corporation that owns stock in the corporation, the effect will be
almost the same as if the close corporation was an individual. Allowing its assets
to be reached chills investment in potentially worthwhile ventures.
Hence, courts analyzing whether to impose liability on parent corporations
must keep these considerations in mind before coming to any conclusions. So far,
the courts holding a parent liable have paid little attention to the size and structure
of the parent, although it is unclear whether in fact any small or close corpora-
tions have in fact been held liable under these decisions. Any future holdings
should determine these characteristics of the parent before imposing CERCLA
liability.
In addition to the inefficiencies created when parents are in fact held liable,
the mere prospect of CERCLA liability for parents, even when the subsidiary has
not engaged in improper hazardous waste disposal techniques, may cast further
inefficiencies onto existing parent-subsidiary relationships. For instance, the
specter of liability may force the parent to liquidate its investments in subsidiaries
that handle hazardous substances so that the parent can avoid altogether any
chance of its becoming personally liable. This may even occur if the subsidiary
has properly stored or disposed of the materials (but this will depend upon the
level of risk the parent is willing to bear). It is probably not in society's interest
for the divestment to occur because the investment would remain absent the
potential for CERCLA liability. Another possibility is that the parent will attempt
to distance itself from the subsidiary in order to demonstrate that it plays little or
no role in the subsidiary's environmental affairs. By pursuing this course, an
effective vehicle for private monitoring of the subsidiary, through protection of
the parent's investment, simply disappears. This harms the parent and results in
a further impediment to the expeditious cleanup of disposal sites.
" Posner, supra note 29, at 512-13.
201 id.
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Alternatively, the parent may decide to merge the subsidiary into it. If the
parent responds in this manner, it will do so because the agency costs are too
high to keep the two firms apart. In general, a parent will monitor a subsidiary's
activities only to the extent necessary to protect its investment. At that point, the
agency costs of monitoring the subsidiary are optimal. Liability of the parent,
whether it be direct or indirect, will not be triggered unless the parent participates
substantially in the actions that resulted in pollution. But, as already pointed out,
the parent may have only undertaken that participation to protect its investment,
not to exploit the subsidiary. If a parent must now monitor those activities to
such an extent to also protect its own assets, then there will be overregulation by
the corporation. This in turn creates an incentive for the parent and subsidiary
to merge; a relationship that is probably not otherwise cost-effective for if it was,
it would have been pursued absent the specter of liability.
In summary, the abrogation of limited liability of parent corporations in the
CERCLA context carries with it economic impacts that are not necessarily benefi-
cial from a societal standpoint. Although it is unclear whether the effects
resulting from the incentives CERCLA liability creates are greater than the
negative consequences of those effects, I suggests that the negative effects
constitute a significant counter-weight. Nonetheless, I have not conducted a
detailed study to determine whether the negative effects outlined are indeed
occurring and if they are, to what extent. Further inquiry is necessary to grasp
more fully the impact which CERCLA liability hatched on parent corporations.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to show that direct liability of parent corporations
under CERCLA cannot be sustained. The statute simply does not authorize the
imposition of direct liability against parents. The courts' holdings that it does
rely too much on the federal interests associated with CERCLA rather than on
the statute's explicit terms. Furthermore, from a policy - specifically economic -
perspective, the imposition of direct liability contains certain inefficiencies. It
is important for both courts and commentators to keep these inefficient effects in
mind when analyzing the issue of direct parent corporation liability. In addition,
further positive analysis is necessary to determine precisely what economic conse-
quences the abrogation of the rule of limited liability under CERCLA has had on
corporate activity.
Nonetheless, this article has also attempted to argue that indirect liability
of parents under CERCLA through piercing the corporate veil is a legitimate
alternative. Courts are authorized to develop federal common law if the federal
interests embodied in a statute are undermined in particular instances. Applying
this rule, courts may close the gaps Congress left in CERCLA through develop-
ment of a federal common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil if it is
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necessary to ensure that parent corporations cannot avoid CERCLA liability
through use of the corporate form.
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